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Politics, Intelligence and Elections in Late Colonial
India: Congress and the Raj in 1937
ANDREW MULDOON
Abstract
This article addresses questions of political reform and colonial intelligence
collection in 1930s India. It focuses on the expectations British colonial offi-
cials had of the impact of the 1935 Government of India Act reforms on Indian
political behaviour, especially regarding the creation of largely autonomous
provincial assemblies. The 1937 provincial elections put these colonial suppo-
sitions to the test, and found them wanting. The article outlines the flawed and
blinkered nature of colonial information gathering, demonstrating how the elec-
tion results, particularly the very strong showing by an organized Indian National
Congress, came as a real surprise to colonial administrators. However, the arti-
cle also shows that these results did not necessarily change colonial opinions
about Indian politics overmuch, as administrators and governors sought to
frame what had happened within their existing understanding of India. Overall,
this piece argues for the persistence of certain ways of colonial thinking in
India, driven by ideological or cultural biases, as well as by the real limitations
on the capability of the colonial state.
Résumé
Cet article aborde la question de la réforme politique et de la collecte du ren-
seignement en Inde dans les années 1930. Il insiste sur les attentes des autorités
coloniales britanniques entourant les réformes politiques contenues dans le
Government of India Act de 1935, notamment en ce qui avait trait à la création
d’assemblées provinciales essentiellement autonomes. Les élections provin-
ciales de 1937 ont mis ces attentes à l’épreuve et en ont finalement exposé les
failles. Cet article présente les faiblesses et la vision étroite de la collecte du
renseignement dans la colonie, révélant à quel point les résultats du scrutin,
notamment le très fort score d’un Congrès national indien bien organisé, ont
réellement étonné les administrateurs de la colonie. Cependant, l’étude révèle
aussi que ces résultats n’ont pas nécessairement modifié l’opinion coloniale
concernant la vie politique indienne, les administrateurs et gouverneurs cher-
chant à expliquer cet épisode dans leur cadre de compréhension de l’Inde. En
fin de compte, l’auteur constate la persistance en Inde de certains cadres de
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pensée coloniaux inspirés par des biais idéologiques ou culturels, ainsi que par
les faiblesses intrinsèques de l’État colonial.
The Government of India Act of 1935 was the culmination of nearly six years of legislative, administrative, and political work. The act, a scheme
for a federated India of autonomous provinces and princely states, all ultimately
under continued British rule, itself ran to hundreds of pages, replete with
annexes, schedules, and draft legal instruments. The construction of the act
required thousands of hours of testimony and deliberation in committees, par-
liamentary commissions, and fact-finding inquiries, as well as volumes of print:
surveys, submissions of evidence, and a substantial part of recorded parlia-
mentary debates. This proposal for Indian political reform was the signature
political event between the advent of the national government in 1931 and the
abdication crisis five years later. It was a consistent part of political discourse,
especially as it threatened to divide the membership of Britain’s most success-
ful political party at the time. The 1935 act’s impact was as significant as the
controversy it had generated. Its provision for the election of provincial legis-
latures gave the Indian National Congress (INC), the party of Gandhi and
Jawaharlal Nehru, a vital opening to establish firmly their authority to speak as
a truly representative Indian political force. Even after 1947 and Indian inde-
pendence, the act remained influential, as the new state adopted its own version
of the federal framework, one that continued to feature a division of powers
between the central and provincial governments with, as in the British version,
significant residuary prerogatives for provincial governors and the federal cen-
tre itself. 
Despite the tremendous attention this act garnered in British political life,
the personalities involved in its creation and the continued importance of this
legislation for the constitutional framework of contemporary India, the act has
not received the sustained historical or scholarly attention one might expect.
There is certainly a great deal of material to work with; in fact there may be
almost too much. Incisive specialist investigations of aspects of the India Act
do indeed exist.1 The act, and the events surrounding it, appear prominently as
well in larger studies of figures such as Gandhi, Churchill, Nehru, and Stanley
Baldwin, and of less well-known — but significant — actors such as Samuel
Hoare, Edward Irwin, and T.B. Sapru. R.J. Moore and Carl Bridge are the
1 Ian Copland, The Princes of India in the endgame of Empire, 1917–1947 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997); Stuart Ball, Baldwin and the Conservative Party: The
Crisis of 1929–1932 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Graham Stewart, Burying
Caesar: The Churchill-Chamberlain Rivalry (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1999);
Basudev Chatterji, Trade, Tariffs and Empire: Lancashire and British Policy in India,
1919–1939 (Delhi: Oxfrod University Press, 1992). 
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authors of the two very detailed examinations of the process of negotiation, cal-
culation, and political maneuvering that led to the act. These works, exhaustive
in their use of archival evidence and articulate in their delineation of a compli-
cated narrative, stand as the best overviews of this event to date and likely will
remain authoritative hereafter.2 Yet much remains for examination, especially
the question of Britain’s rationale for adopting this instrument as a way to check
the growth of the nationalist movement. With that larger issue in mind, this
paper focuses specifically on the working of the act between 1935 and 1937,
and on British efforts to predict the impact of this plan in India.3
The vision many in British governing circles had of the India Act raises
important questions about the ways in which the Raj worked. As those who
have examined the act have noticed, its supporters held the sanguine view that
the plan for federation and provincial autonomy would effectively counter a
growing nationalist movement by sowing discord in the Indian National
Congress and distracting Indians from the movement itself.4 The questions,
however, remain: why did these politicians and colonial officials believe it, and
why did they pursue this strategy even as evidence increased against its effi-
cacy? The answer lies in the beliefs many British élites held about India, and in
the ways in which these understandings shaped, and were shaped by, methods
and institutions for acquiring information in the colonial state. The mixture of
colonial cultural assumptions, a sclerotic intelligence apparatus, and a dynamic
Indian political environment produced a narrow, but pervasive, and persuasive,
understanding of India among those most responsible for governing and sus-
taining the Raj. In their efforts to “make a society legible,” as the political
theorist James Scott has put it, British administrators “saw like a state” and thus
transformed “what was a social hieroglyph into a legible and administratively
more convenient format.”5 While Scott might assert that all states work this
way, the problem of the British colonial state was not that it existed as such, but
was that it was a certain sort of state, one informed by a specific culture and one
underpinned by a flawed and overtaxed administrative structure. Its existence
2 Carl Bridge, Holding India to the Empire: The British Conservative Party and the 1935
Constitution (New Delhi: Sterling, 1986); R.J. Moore, The Crisis of Indian Unity, 1917–1940
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974). 
3 For a fuller treatment of this topic, see Andrew Muldoon, Empire, Politics and the Creation of
the 1935 India Act: Last Act of the Raj (London: Ashgate, 2009). 
4 This is Bridge’s and Moore’s argument. See R.J. Moore, Escape from Empire: The Attlee
Government and the Indian Problem (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 3–4. For simi-
lar contentions, see John Darwin, “Imperialism in Decline? Tendencies in British Imperial
Policies between the Wars,” Historical Journal 23, no. 3 (1980): 657–79; D.A. Low, Eclipse
of Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), esp. 88–94. 
5 James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition
Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 2–3. Scott notes that such an approach
“produces an overall, aggregate, synoptic view of a selective reality,” 11. 
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as a colonial state, moreover, imbued it with even further difficulty, notably in
its problematic interaction with indigenous sources of information. 
In addressing these issues, this paper engages with a larger and contested
debate over colonial governance and intelligence assessment in particular, and
over the creation of “colonial knowledge” in general. Christopher Bayly has
addressed both concerns extensively in his Empire and Information, though it
is an account which deals only briefly with the twentieth century, and he has
encouraged historians to continue work on imperial intelligence, which
“remains a poorly studied area.”6 Regarding the importance of cultural belief,
and its role in essentializing Indians and other colonial subjects, the events of
1935–1937 argue for the continued significance of cultural nostrums in shaping
imperial policy, but also points to the failure of colonial institutions to keep
pace with rapidly changing situations on the ground. 
Imperial Culture and Imperial Policy 
Discussions, within the Conservative Party and in India, about how best to con-
front Gandhi and the INC took place within an environment where there existed
already a widely-disseminated and fairly comprehensive set of beliefs about
India and Indians. During the period of British rule in India, notably in the late
nineteenth century, there had emerged several strong ideas about what India
was and what the British role there should be. These British assumptions about
India were quite powerful and pervasive, so much so that they proved influen-
tial in shaping the British response to Indian nationalism. Yet these sorts of
perceptions gained power because of the various limitations and flaws present
in the colonial state’s effort to collect and analyze political intelligence. The Raj
was hardly an all-seeing, omniscient entity, hamstrung as it was by sheer lack
of personnel, inadequate training (especially in Indian languages), and an
absolutely overwhelming amount of information to digest continually. Added to
these was the relative isolation of many colonial civil servants and administra-
tors, even down to the level of the police, from the vast majority of the Indian
population. The small number of Indians who retained ties of one sort or
another to the colonial state in fact enjoyed disproportionate influence as
sources of information and guidance. In my book, Empire, Politics and the
Creation of the 1935 India Act: Last Act of the Raj, I deal in detail with one
such person, the Indian lawyer Tej Bahadur Sapru, whose influence might be
judged by the remark of the Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court in late
1929: “Sapru is my authority as regards Mr. Gandhi and is quite sure about it.”7
6 C.A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence gathering and social communication in
India, 1780–1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 3. 
7 Grimwood Mears to Irwin, 25 October 1929, as quoted in D.A. Low, Britain and Indian
Nationalism: The imprint of ambiguity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 46. For
another example of Mears’ reliance on Sapru, see his note to Benn at the India Office in ibid., 51. 
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In such a situation cultural explanations found some hold and helped guide
British thinking towards what would be the last major political reform in India
before 1947: the 1935 Government of India Act, a plan for autonomous Indian
provinces collected around a central government controlled in part by the
viceroy and in part by an assembly of elected representatives and appointees
from various princely states. The hope in New Delhi and London was that this
maneuver would seriously hamper any further nationalist unity by attracting
Indians worn out by Gandhian-style protests and eager for political office and
patronage. The colonial assumption was that provincial differences would fur-
ther hamper INC efforts to maintain a unified front, while separate delegations
of Muslims and princely representatives at the centre would serve as a bulwark
if the Congress should gain a significant place in the assembly. Local and
provincial rivalries, the possibility of spoils of office and a lack of Indian polit-
ical will to maintain a struggle for substantive goals: all of these notions rested
upon well-used colonial stereotypes. The 1937 provincial elections would be
the test of their efficacy. 
The images of India that entered British consciousness through these vari-
ous outlets shared some fundamental similarities in their presentation of Indian
life, religion, and political society. It was a discourse that emphasized the idea
of “difference”: not only the difference between Britain and India, but also the
various differences or oppositions which existed in India itself.8 A recurrent
trope of this discourse was the difference between Western modernity and an
India still plagued by “ancient” belief systems and social constructions. In
short, India appeared an “authentically primitive” place.9 The basic notion
underlying many British assumptions was that the vast majority of India’s
inhabitants lived in small agricultural villages; this was the “real” India, rural,
placid and apolitical.10 British administrators made something of a fetish of
these rural communities. Lord Curzon saw the “real Indian people” among “the
Indian poor, the Indian peasant, the patient, humble, silent millions.” They had
“no politics,” but were the “bone and sinew of the country.”11 This understand-
8 The best overview of these complementary understandings of difference is Thomas Metcalf,
Ideologies of the Raj (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
9 Joselyn Zivin, “The Imagined Reign of the Iron Lecturer: Village Broadcasting in Colonial
India,” Modern Asian Studies 32, no. 3 (1998): 717–38. 
10 There has been some excellent work on this premise which underpinned the British understand-
ing of India, and my work is heavily indebted to it. My account here draws upon the following:
Benita Parry, Delusions and Discoveries: India in the British Imagination, 1880-1930 (London:
Verso, 2nd. edn., 1998), 35–77; Metcalf, 69–72; Shompa Lahiri, Indians in Britain: Anglo-Indian
Encounters, Race and Identity: 1880–1930 (London: Routledge, 2000), 82–115.
11 From Curzon’s speech in 1905, quoted in Derek Blakeley, “India in the Debate over Empire,”
unpublished paper presented at 1996 Annual Meeting of the American Historical Society,
Atlanta, Georgia. I thank Dr. Blakeley for this and other references to Curzon’s Indian views.
See also Nayana Goradia, Lord Curzon: The Last of the British Moghuls (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1993), 177. 
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ing of India found many exponents, including Richard Temple, H.H. Risley,
and Katherine Mayo, who praised rural villages as the “true homes of India,”
inhabited by nine-tenths of the population: “hard-working cultivators of the
soil, simple, illiterate, peaceful, kindly.”12 Indian villages were portrayed as
examples of an “ancient” society, one in which change came slowly, if it came
at all.13 These portrayals placed great emphasis on the apolitical nature of these
rural Indians. The interwar years also saw significant publications on this theme
by Indian civil servants themselves, most notably Malcolm Darling and Frank
Lugard Brayne.14 Darling found Punjabis to be “the very marrow and soul of
the peasantry,” men who had “[g]rit, skill in farming and a fine physique.”15
The common understanding of the real India, then, envisioned a panoply of
rural villages, parochial and self-contained, where life centred on the rise and
fall of the agricultural calendar, and the peasantry remained blessedly ignorant
of the Western modernity which had affected urban India with such unnatural
results. 
However, for all the praise of this peasantry’s simplicity and community,
British descriptions remained largely paternalistic as well. Though inclined
towards placidity or contentment, rural India was still prone to the irrationality,
violence, and excitability which, in the British understanding, plagued the
Eastern races. Hinduism epitomized this continued Indian backwardness. The
pervasive British understanding of Hindu India contained some basic, if at
times contradictory, assumptions. The religion was synonymous with weak-
ness, both physical and moral, but was also regarded as ancient — traditional
and even hidebound — and therefore a metonym for Indian society as a whole.
Katherine Mayo’s Mother India, a must-read for many in British colonial cir-
cles in the 1920s — and elsewhere: it had 20 printings between 1928 and 1930
— had reinforced several stereotypes about Hinduism, most particularly the
notion that it was effeminate, governed by unrestrained sexual desire, and led
by “broken-nerved, low-spirited, petulant ancients” whose followers were
12 Katherine Mayo, Mother India (New York: Blue Ribbon Books, 1927), 66; Richard Temple,
Men and Events of My Time in India (Delhi: B.R. Publishing, 1985, originally published 1882),
504–5. See also C. Sandford, India: Land of Regrets (London: Fenland Press, 1934), 121–2,
190, 236. 
13 For example, see Edmund Candler’s description in his “Kashi,” excerpted in E. Boehmer, ed.,
Empire Writing: An Anthology of Colonial Literature 1870–1918 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1998), 339–44. 
14 Frank Lugard Brayne, The Remaking of Village India (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1929); Malcolm Darling, Wisdom and Waste in the Punjab Village (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1934). For more on Brayne, see Zivin, and for more on Darling, see Clive Dewey,
Anglo-Indian Attitudes: The Mind of the Indian Civil Service (London: Hambledon, 1993). 
15 Malcolm Darling, The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt (London: Oxford University
Press, 1925), 38. 
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inevitably “narrow-chested, near-sighted [and] anemic.”16 Hindus were “small
weak and timid,” according to an official source in 1909.17 Moreover, by virtue
of the caste system, Hindus remained enmeshed in a pre-modern social struc-
ture built on hierarchy and ties of kinship.18 Even a supporter of Indian causes
such as Edward Thompson (father of the historian, E.P. Thompson) admitted
that caste had left India mired in “Hindu social injustice.”19 The retired Indian
administrator Rushbrook Williams summarized this view in 1938, arguing that
“to many Hindus the duty owed to other members of the joint family appears
something far stronger than any duty owed to the State; what Westerners call
nepotism is in India a positive virtue.”20 This immorality and lack of self-dis-
cipline also manifested itself, to British eyes, in Indians’ apparently innate
aversion to honesty and preference for what Curzon called “craftiness and
diplomatic wile.”21 An overarching theme, then, was that of India’s immaturity,
a condition which manifested itself in sexual license, physical and mental
weakness, a penchant for graft, and an aversion to honesty and plain-speak-
ing.22 Moreover, this particular sense of Indian and British difference was not
the only framework Britons employed to understand India, for it potently com-
bined with another British colonial conviction, that of the numerous differences
which divided India itself. 
The British politician Lord Lothian, who had toured India in the early
1930s, argued that “Indian society … is essentially a congeries [of] widely sep-
arated classes, races and communities with divergencies of interests and
hereditary sentiment which for ages have precluded common action or local
unanimity.”23 If British accounts sometimes presented a seemingly monolithic
Hindu India, at many other times colonial assessments stressed how caste
demarcations divided and fragmented this same population. This sense that
16 Mayo, 3. For concise summaries of this view of Hinduism, see Metcalf, 92–112. For a wide-
ranging and incisive study of the impact of Mayo’s work in India and beyond, see Mrinalini
Sinha, Spectres of Mother India: The Global Restructuring of an Empire (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2006). 
17 Imperial Gazetteer, I, 447. 
18 For discussion of the growth of British ideas about caste, see Bernard Cohn, “Notes on the
History of the Study of Indian Society and Culture,” in An Anthropologist among the
Historians, ed. Bernard Cohn (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987); Nicholas Dirks, Castes
of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001), chaps. 3 and 10. 
19 Edward Thompson, The Reconstruction of India (London: Faber and Faber, 1930), 262–3. 
20 Quoted in Andrew Rotter, Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 129–30. 
21 Parry, 60. 
22 My discussion here owes much to Metcalf and Sinha. For examples of such descriptions, see
Mayo, as well as Patricia Kendall, Come with me to India! (New York: Scribner’s, 1931). 
23 Quoted in Bidyut Chakrabarty, “The Communal Award of 1932 and its Implications in
Bengal,” Modern Asian Studies 23, no. 3 (1989): 493–523. 
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caste was such a fundamental force in India pervaded British governing circles
to such a degree that, for example, India Office intelligence reports on indige-
nous politicians began with a classification of these men’s caste status:
Malaviya was a “Malwa Brahmin,” Nehru a “Kashmiri Brahmin,” and even
Jinnah was described as “Mussalman (Khoja).”24 Caste was merely one of sev-
eral supposed characteristics of Hinduism, moreover, that the British used to
distinguish these Indians from those of other faiths, in service of the notion that
the subcontinent was permanently and historically divided by religion, and by
Hinduism and Islam specifically.25 The 1934 report of the parliamentary com-
mittee which examined the proposed Indian political reforms concluded,
“Hinduism is distinguished by the phenomenon of caste … the religion of Islam
on the other hand is based upon the conception of the equality of man.”26 Indian
Muslims and Sikhs garnered further respect from British officials who consid-
ered the two groups as hardier and more martial specimens, and this conviction
recurred even in fictional accounts of life in the Raj.27 Hindu weakness
expressed itself not just physically, but also very much in an Indian penchant for
bribery, outlandish rhetoric, and double-dealing. A popular study of India from
1934 concluded,: “The Hindu is the talker, the Mohammedan the fighter.”28
These ideas about notable differences between Indian religious groups relied
heavily not only on theological explanations, but also on theories about the
impact of environment and geography on the development of divergent popu-
lations within India. These conceptions further reinforced the image of India as
a land divided. 
The “martial races” of northern India, Sikhs from the Punjab and Muslims
from the northwest frontier, came from rugged climates that produced a hardy
24 For all three, see profiles in India Office Records (hereafter IOR), Indian Political Intelligence
files (hereafter IPI files), L/PJ/12/201/2-4, 8-10, 27-29. “Khoja” refers to a particular sect
within Shi’ite Islam. 
25 There is now a substantial literature on this British conception of a communally-divided India,
and on the possible impact that such an understanding has had on Indian politics throughout
the twentieth century. For the former, see Metcalf, as well as Gyanendra Pandey, The
Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India (Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1990). For the debate on the latter, see among others, the essays by Amartya Sen and Ayesha
Jalal in Nationalism, Democracy & Development: State and Politics in India, eds. Sugata Bose
and Ayesha Jalal (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998); and the contributions of Mushirul
Hasan and Sumit Sarkar in Contesting the Nation: Religion, Community and the Politics of
Democracy in India, ed. David Ludden (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1996). 
26 Conservative Party Archives (hereafter CPA), microform 1934/52, “The Future of India,” Joint
Select Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform, 1934. 
27 Francis Hutchins, The Illusion of Permanence: British Imperialism in India (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1967), esp. chap. 8; Richard Fox, Lions of the Punjab: Culture in
the making (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), ch. 8. 
28 Sandford, 111. 
167
POLITICS, INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTIONS IN LATE COLONIAL INDIA:
CONGRESS AND THE RAJ IN 1937
and forthright peasant stock, while the steamier environment of Bengal sapped
its inhabitants of both moral and physical vigor, leaving them enervated and
indolent.29 Moreover, these hardier Indians came from largely rural areas, in
essence, from the real India. Indian cities such as Calcutta, conversely, had pro-
duced, in British eyes, a repellent hybrid: the anglicized Indian or “babu,” an
Indian, usually Hindu and not one of the martial groups, who had acquired a
veneer of Western learning, but could never gain the solid moral strength of
character of the Englishman. This image recurred especially in British descrip-
tions of nationalist politicians, many of whom were Western-educated.30 The
babu, depicted as caught between his pretensions and his inalterable Indian self,
was a pitiful figure, one apparently so confused about his own identity that he
lived in a perpetual state of irrational excitability. It was hardly a coincidence
that the figure of the babu became prominent in British imperial culture at the
turn of the twentieth century, a period which saw the rise of INC nationalism in
India. Whereas British commentators praised the peasants and princes who
accepted their role in the hierarchy of the Raj, they castigated those Indians
who wished to rise above their pre-ordained station. One British newspaper
concluded that the founders of the Congress were “vapouring, gushing rhetori-
cians ... busy-bodies, notoriety-seekers and incendiaries.”31
This, then, was the image of India encountered and absorbed by those
charged with meeting the challenge of a rising Indian nationalism in the years
after World War I. It was a picture of India that stressed the overarching impor-
tance of difference and diversity: the gulf between a rational West and a
superstitious, sentimental, and parochial East, as well as the vertical and hori-
zontal cross-hatchings that divided Indian society against itself. This discursive
understanding, combined with a particular and selective reading of Indian
events, served to shape and fashion the response of British policy-makers who
sought to derail any Indian attempt to undermine the Raj. This was, perhaps, the
supreme test of British pretensions to know and understand Indians even better
than Indians understood themselves. Would colonial knowledge save colonial
rule? 
29 For further discussion of British views of the Indian climate, see Kennedy, chap. 2; E.M.
Collingham, Imperial Bodies: The Physical Experience of the Raj, c. 1800–1947 (Cambridge:
Blackwell, 2001). Kipling promoted similar ideas in his fiction, especially the short story, “The
Head of the District.” 
30 See especially Sinha, chap. 1; also Teresa Hubel, Whose India? The Independence Struggle in
British and Indian Fiction and History (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996), chap. 1. 
31 Quoted in Antoinette Burton, At the Heart of the Empire: Indians and the Colonial Encounter
in Late-Victorian Britain (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998),
65. 
168
JOURNAL OF THE CHA 2009 / REVUE DE LA S.H.C.
Culture and Colonial Intelligence 
Imperial information about India came through several channels and from mul-
tiple sources. As we have already seen, many Britons, especially in élite circles,
encountered images of India and descriptions of Indian behaviour in both 
popular and academic discourse, as well as within certain social and cultural
environments. What remains to be determined is the precise nature of the inter-
play among these ideas, policy-making and the colonial response to the rise of
the nationalist movement. How prevalent were these ideas? Were these assump-
tions about India so strong in and of themselves as to overpower any other
possible interpretations of Indian actions, or was their influence ultimately dic-
tated by the intelligence-gathering abilities, or inabilities, of the colonial state? 
Among those who served the Raj in India, certain beliefs about indigenous
society did seem likely to exist. The bulk of this civil service came from profes-
sional families and élite educational backgrounds, with more than a few
representing families that had served in India in some capacity for several gen-
erations.32 Their educations, formal and informal, had certainly exposed these
administrators to the prevailing understandings of India: its backwardness, the
identification of the peasant as the truly Indian type, and the idea of an India
divided many ways against itself.33 Furthermore, service in India did still attract
those who saw empire and the “uplift” of the natives, as a Christian duty.34
Furnished with such notions, and often placed hurriedly into unfamiliar territory,
many in the Indian Civil Service (ICS), unsurprisingly, appeared to frame their
approach, in rural districts especially, along the lines of this received wisdom.
Instead of grasping the inroads made by the INC in the 1920s and 1930s, they
remained wedded to the conviction that Indian politics were only parochial, the
concern really of the rural landowners more than of the placid peasantry who,
without any “outside stimulus” cared “little or nothing about politics.”35
32 See Buettner, Empire Families: Britons and Late Imperial India (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004), 180–7. For more on these family ties and the sentiment that the peasant was the
true Indian, see the collected interviews at Louisiana State University Library’s exhibit,
“British Voices from South Asia.” <www.lib.lsu.edu/special/exhibits/india/intro.htm)>. 
33 See Malcolm Hailey’s recollections of his own education in John W. Cell, Hailey: A Study in
British Imperialism, 1872–1969 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992), 1–9. Potter
notes that over 60 percent of the ICS serving between the world wars had attended both an
English public school and Oxford or Cambridge. D.C. Potter, India’s Political Administrators,
1919-1983 (Oxford: Clarendon press, 1986), 68–71. 
34 C.A. Bayly, “Returning the British to South Asian History: The Limits of Colonial
Hegemony,” Origins of Nationalism in South Asia: Patriotism and Ethical Government in the
Making of Modern India, ed. C.A. Bayly (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 284–5.
Andrew Parke Hume (ICS 1927–1947) was one example. See India Office Hume Collection,
Mss. Eur. D.724/19. 
35 L.S.S. O’Malley, The Indian Civil Service, 1601–1930 (London: John Murray, 1931), 154; Potter,
42–3; Simon Epstein, “District Officers in Decline: The Erosion of British Authority in the
Bombay Countryside, 1919–1947,” Modern Asian Studies 16, no. 3 (1982): 493–518, esp. 502. 
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These ideas seem to have been especially prevalent among those serving in
the ICS between the wars; they likely permeated other parts of the Indian
administration, particularly the higher ranks of the Indian Police Service, as
evidence adduced below should demonstrate. Brayne and Darling were well-
known exponents of such a paternalistic view of the Indian peasantry and the
image they helped to create, of the Punjab peasant in particular, resonated. In
1928, for example, more ICS newcomers requested a posting to the Punjab than
to any other region.36 Even if they did not gravitate to the Punjab, ICS admin-
istrators throughout rural India in these years consistently concluded that the
peasantry remained apolitical and oblivious to the inducements of the national-
ists.37 As Shahid Amin has revealed, the ICS judges who presided over the trials
and appeals of the defendants in the 1922 Chauri Chaura attack, where more than
20 Indian policemen died after a crowd set their station alight, refused to see the
Indians’ actions as at all tied to politics and to Gandhi in particular. Instead, the
defendants were “deluded peasants” who saw Gandhi as a “miracle worker”;
such a vision meant the colonial state saw the event as “a common blur of rustic
excesses fuelled by local political machinations.”38 Reginald Maxwell of the ICS
sensed in 1924 that the “local notables” were “nice, simple, hospitable people
who are totally untouched by political agitation so long as they are understood
and treated politely and feel that their position is recognized.”39 Bolstering such
conceptions was the relative distance many of these administrators experienced
from Indians, whether out of racial prejudice, pressure of work, transfers, or lin-
guistic difficulties. The report of the Simon Commission, which visited India in
1928 to examine political progress there, concluded that there was especially a
growing disconnect between local District Officers and local people.40 Henry
Cotton, a prominent ICS man in Bengal in the 1880s, had recognized this much
earlier, noting the instability of a system where rule lay in the hands of “a small
number of foreign visitors, in a state of isolation produced by a difference in reli-
gion, ideas and manners, which cuts them off from all intimate communion with
the people.”41 An Indian who had joined the ICS after World War I remembered:
“It is strange to reflect that the members of the Civil Service, whether British or
Indian, hardly ever met the political leaders.”42 As one historian of colonial rule
36 Anthony Kirk-Greene, Britain’s Imperial Administrators, 1858–1966 (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2000), 104–5; Gilmour, 57. 
37 See the district reports quoted in Low, Eclipse of Empire, 108–11. 
38 Shahid Amin, Event, Metaphor, Memory: Chauri Chaura 1922–1992 (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), 109–10, 192. 
39 Quoted in Collingham, 187. 
40 O’Malley, 196. 
41 Quoted in David Gilmour, The Ruling Caste: Imperial Lives in the Victorian Raj (New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), 259. 
42 H.V.R. Iengar quoted in Kewal L. Panjabi, ed., The Civil Servant in India: By Ex-Indian Civil
Servants (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1965), 121. 
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has concluded, “the social isolation and political biases of officials often meant
that the intelligence was not read aright,” and that furthermore, colonial officials
spent much of their time “talking to the wrong people,” including landlords and
local notables.43
The presence of these assumptions in colonial thinking in India may not
have been, however, an indication that culture was the one truly determinative
factor in official assessments of Indian behavior. Ruling India had become a
massive, unwieldy, and challenging venture by the start of the 1920s. As if
India’s geographical size, linguistic diversity and population were not enough,
there were specific aspects of British governance that further complicated the
administration of the Raj. Though the hierarchy of British rule seemed fairly
simple, those who occupied these administrative positions often found them-
selves in great conflict, especially over issues of responsibility and authority
between those in India and those in London. The Secretary of State for India, a
member of the cabinet, enjoyed final authority over Indian policy, but was
responsible, ultimately, not to administrators there, but to metropolitan politi-
cians and party supporters. The India Office in London, staffed by career civil
servants drawn from some of the same educational and “gentlemanly” back-
grounds as the ministers they served, worked both to advise the secretary of
state and to implement policy, a massive responsibility that made the India
Office a huge department of state by the early twentieth century.44 These
Whitehall mandarins, such as Sir Arthur Hirtzel and Sir S. Findlater Stewart,
who served as successive permanent under-secretaries between 1924 and 1937,
were not members of the ICS though, their expertise residing much more in the
mastery of bureaucratic processes and administration. Of course, that did not
stop Hirtzel from asserting that, among other things, in India “‘the principle of
contradiction’ is not a law of thought.”45
The politicization of the highest levels of Indian administration was
another potentially disruptive, or at least complicating, factor in governing the
Raj. The viceroyalty, as well as the prestigious governorships of Bombay,
Madras, and Bengal, had become part of British domestic political patronage,
leading to the appointment of administrators who may have been well-con-
nected at Westminster, but who had very little experience of India. In the 1930s,
43 C.A. Bayly, “Knowing the Country: Empire and Information in India,” Modern Asian Studies
27, no. 1 (1993): 3–43, esp. 39–41. 
44 One of the few administrative histories of the India Office is Arnold P. Kaminsky, The India
Office, 1880–1910 (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1986). Hugh Tinker has noted of the India
Office advisers that their “entire career was passed in London, so they tended to view India as
it was when they first joined the office and regarded any pressures for change as of transient
significance.” Hugh Tinker, Viceroy: Curzon to Mountbatten (Karachi: Oxford University
Press, 1997), 7. 
45 India Office, Irwin Papers, Mss. Eur. c.152/18/209, Hirtzel to Lord Irwin, 26 January 1929. 
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for example, past and future Conservative MPs occupied all three of these gov-
ernorships.46 Such a process of appointment had serious implications,
especially for the supposed independence of these influential governors from
the concerns of the party leadership that had appointed them.47 This situation
also meant that, party political considerations aside, Indian policy-making at its
highest levels, whether in India or in London, was in the hands of a fairly
homogeneous few whose exposure to ideas about India and its inhabitants had
been narrow and confined very much to specific, recurrent tropes of an élite
colonial discourse that permeated the world of such Tory gentlemen. 
These senior administrators did not, of course, live completely isolated
lives, whether in India or in London; but their own access to information about
indigenous politics and society was limited in important ways. There were sev-
eral reasons why information, and political intelligence particularly, did not
make its way either smoothly or accurately into the hands of imperial policy-
makers. Governors, especially political appointees, and other senior
administrators operated within a circumscribed world, usually meeting only
Indians from the urban economic and civic élite, a system one scholar has aptly
named “‘neo-darbari’ politics.”48 (These Britons were, of course, surrounded
by Indian servants and retainers constantly, but these figures hardly registered
on the colonial conscience as even real persons.49) The ICS, upon whose pre-
sumed expertise British rule rested, was not a repository of wholly reliable
information either. In some ways, this fabled “steel frame” of district officers,
magistrates, and advisers seemed in danger of collapsing during the interwar
years, as morale and recruitment fell, while workloads increased.50 Already
charged with immense judicial, administrative, and fiscal responsibilities, ICS
men found themselves transferred frequently around India with little time to
familiarize themselves with local languages, social structures, or cultures.51
One administrator later remembered that he had learned Marathi as an ICS pro-
bationer, but was never posted anywhere that he could use it.52
46 Sir Frederick Sykes and Lord Brabourne in Bombay; Lord Erskine and Sir George Stanley in
Madras; and Sir Frederick Stanley Jackson and Sir John Anderson in Bengal. 
47 Governors in Bombay and Madras in the late 1800s were allowed direct correspondence with
the Indian Secretary, while all other provincial administrators were not. Gilmour, 21. 
48 D.A. Low, “The Climactic Years 1917-1947” in Congress & the Raj: Facets of the Indian Struggle
1917–1947, ed. D.A. Low (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), 4; Zareer Masani, Indian
Tales of the Raj (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987). 
49 On the ubiquitous and disquieting presence of Indian servants, see Collingham, 93–113. 
50 O’Malley, 147–9. 
51 Potter, chaps. 1 and 2; Charles Allen, ed., Plain Tales from the Raj: Images of British India in
the Twentieth Century (London: Andre Deutsch, 1975), chap. 4. 
52 Dennis Judd, ed., A British Tale of Indian and Foreign Service: The Memoirs of Sir Ian Scott
(London: Radcliffe Press, 1999), 37. Gilmour notes of the Victorian Raj that “many Civilians
turned up in their first district largely ignorant of its language.” Gilmour, 61. 
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The technical practice of intelligence collection in this colonial state
remained flawed in its structure and its mechanics. As historians of the Raj
know quite well, the bureaucracy of British India generated an astounding
amount of paperwork: correspondence, reports, circulars, censuses and all man-
ner of other supervisory documents.53 Simply keeping up with the flow of
information, much less analyzing and assessing it, was a Herculean task, one
that distracted local officials from cultivating potential sources, and often
resulted in the production of reports that were pro forma or, as Christopher
Bayly has put it, “curiously ritualized documents.”54 There were indeed efforts
to construct and utilize a separate system of intelligence collection in India,
building upon the institutions that had emerged at the turn of the century to
counter violent nationalist activity, especially in Bengal.55 By the end of the
1920s, there was a Central Intelligence Bureau (CIB) for the government of
India in New Delhi, supported by Criminal Investigation Departments (CID) of
one form or another in each province.56 The CIB in Delhi, in coordination with
British domestic intelligence and New Scotland Yard, fed information to the
Indian Political Intelligence (IPI) division of the India Office in London.57
Among the items gathered by the IPI were fortnightly summaries of local
events submitted by each province, police surveillance reports, and information
gathered from censoring and opening Indian mail. The system was hardly per-
fect though, with the Delhi CID limited to a staff of 55 in 1930, and with the
simultaneous existence of three different intelligence-gathering organizations
in the north-west frontier provinces until 1933.58
This interwar intelligence apparatus, of course, did nothing to lighten the
workloads of the provincial civil servants who were expected to provide the
biweekly reports which served as the nexus of the entire system. In Bombay, to
take one example of what these officials faced, the secretary of the province’s
home department received near-daily reports from the Bombay city police com-
missioner, weekly abstracts of intelligence from the provincial police generally,
digests of local editorial opinion for the fortnight and, of course, accounts of
53 As Antoinette Burton has noted recently, colonial archives can be daunting places for histori-
ans even before they realize just how much there is to read. See Burton, “Archive Stories;
Gender in the Making of Imperial and Colonial Histories,” in Gender and Empire, ed.
Phillippa Levine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 281–93. 
54 Bayly, “Knowing the Country,” 38. 
55 Richard J. Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence
of the Indian Empire 1904–1924 (London: Frank Cass, 1995). 
56 Madras seemed to have no true Special Branch until the 1940s, however. See Michael
Silvestri, “The Thrill of ‘Simply Dressing Up’: The Indian Police, Disguise and Intelligence
Work in Colonial India,” Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History 2, no. 2 (2001), fn. 17. 
57 For the records of the IPI, see IOR files classified under L/P&J/12. 
58 P.J. Griffiths, To Guard My People: The History of the Indian Police (London: Ernest Benn,
1971), 342–54. 
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revenue collection, criminal prosecutions, and other sundry affairs.59 Limited
to four or five pages, these biweekly reports could not help, therefore, but be
selective, reductive, and even unintentionally misleading. In practice, these
local summaries, with a few exceptions, soon came to resemble each other with
some frequency, both in form and content, reporting on public meetings, local
crime figures, prices, and prosecutions.60 These reports, and others from Delhi,
demonstrated furthermore a greater reliance on local newspapers and other
journals than on native informants for raw intelligence.61
The government of India did not possess the manpower, funds, or legal
sanction necessary to carry out a full-scale operation of surveillance and infil-
tration of the nationalist movement.62 This was especially evident in the
countryside, as in the United Provinces (UP) where, in one historian’s estima-
tion, changes in police practice reduced the number of indigenous agents like
chaukidars (watchmen) by two-thirds from 1900 to 1930.63 The head of the
provincial police admitted in 1931, therefore, that “[o]ur intelligence system
has broken down and we are no longer in a position to anticipate communal dis-
turbances and breaches of the peace in rural areas.”64 Furthermore, those Indian
police constables and officials who made up the bulk of the force were them-
selves limited in the information they could collect. Well-known and
recognized even in cities, these Indians could not observe political gatherings
unobtrusively and, as the nationalist movement grew, so did the ostracism of
these men, leaving them further hampered in developing reliable sources of
information.65 The director of the Delhi Intelligence Bureau, David Petrie, rec-
ognized in some way the difficulties faced by Indian policemen, noting in 1929
the potential for “disaster if we let the Police get the idea that Government is
impotent in upholding its position and authority; for we can scarcely blame any
Indian for thinking that, if a Nationalist Government is about to be established,
59 For an example of what the Bombay Home Department Secretary tackled in 1930 and 1931
alone, see Mahrashtra State Archives Online (hereafter MSAO), “Source Material for a
History of the Freedom Movement in India,” vol. II, parts I–III, <http://www.maharashtra.
gov.in/english/gazetteer/Source_material_files/Source_material.htm>. Accessed October
2007. 
60 For example, see the reports from the U.P. for 1929–1930 at IOR, L/P&J/12/695. 
61 On the impact of the emergence of this Indian political press as a new “ecumene” in North
India, see Bayly, Empire and Information, 351. For remarks on the rise of these newspapers as
sources of intelligence, see Bayly, “Knowing the Country,” 40. 
62 For the Indian government’s lack of enthusiasm for using secret police and their lack of legal
standing to pursue Gandhi as a terrorist, see Popplewell, 317, 333–4. 
63 Gyanesh Kudaisya, Region, Nation, “Heartland”: Uttar Pradesh in India’s Body Politic (New
Delhi: Sage, 2006), 124. 
64 Ibid., 48 
65 Ibid., 48–9. 
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his lot will scarcely be an enviable one who has been found fighting in the last
ditch for the British Raj.”66
The most that provincial governments, like those in the Punjab and
Bombay, might do was to observe these gatherings and report that the speeches
were “beyond the understanding of many” in attendance or that their partici-
pants came from the “ignorant masses and particularly youthful element [who]
must be impressed by demonstrations and influenced by violent speeches deliv-
ered with impunity.”67 The government of India was able to continue to
intercept letters to and from notable Indian politicians, including both Nehrus,
Gandhi, and Tej Bahadur Sapru; but this was hardly a secret to the nationalists,
nor was it an effective means of judging nationalist sentiment and organization
at the local or provincial levels.68 One of Jawaharlal Nehru’s correspondents
noted at the end of a letter: “I am sure the gentleman who reads this letter before
it reaches you is a nice man, kind in his home etc. So I hope that, having copied
the letter, he will send it on promptly to you.”69 And, having imprisoned
Gandhi in mid-1930, administrators found that no one at Yeravda Central
Prison, or in the higher levels of the prison system generally, spoke Gujarati
well enough to monitor any interviews the Mahatma might give.70
An assessment of the precise weight that cultural presumptions had on
Indian intelligence gathering, both in its operation and in analyzes that flowed
from it, is therefore difficult because the presence of these ideas was not the
only flaw in the system. In the first place, the colonial state in the interwar years
faced an overwhelming task simply in administering India, never mind trying
to monitor and assess nationalist activities and the rapidly expanding Indian
political press. Due to the pressure of this work, as well as some cultural pre-
sumptions about rural India in particular, district officers and others were often
not in touch with representative local opinion, just as politically-appointed gov-
ernors, and even viceroys, who themselves often had little experience in India,
had contact with only a very limited slice of Indian society. Moreover, those
departments of the colonial state dedicated to the collection and dissemination
of intelligence lacked all sorts of resources to sustain an operation of such scale
and scope. Thus, confronted by both a strengthening nationalist movement and
66 Quoted in Anandswarup Gupta, The Police in British India 1861–1947 (New Delhi: Concept,
1979), 445. 
67 IOR, L/P&J/12/292/13, Extract from Local Govt. Report (Punjab), April 1928; India Office,
Sykes Papers, Mss. Eur. f150/2a/5-6, Bombay Govt. Report to Home Department, Govt. of
India, 30 January 1930. 
68 For examples of this postal censorship, see reports of IOR, Indian Intelligence Bureau (here-
after IIB), L/P&J/12/292/23-29, regarding correspondence by Motilal and Jawaharlal, 26 April
1928 and 1 November 1928. 
69 Edward Thompson to J. Nehru, 26 October 1936, in J. Nehru, A Bunch of Old Letters (London:
Asia Publishing, 1960), 208. 
70 MSAO, III/III/194-196, Report of Inspector-General of Prisons, 8 May 1930. 
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a correspondingly inadequate system for monitoring or analyzing it, it was not
surprising if the policy-makers of this colonial administration latched firmly
onto what they understood were, and what they believed to be, the “real” ways
in which India worked. 
This sort of development was not without precedent in the nearly two cen-
turies of British rule. As Bayly has noted for the nineteenth century, this “practical
orientalism” often resulted from an “absence of real intelligence or a fuller under-
standing of the society [the British] were dealing with” and led to “officials
[taking] appearances and argot to be symbolic of character and intentions.”
“Information panics” grew out of the colonial state’s inability to comprehend
indigenous social and cultural practices and out of the periodic rumors of insur-
rection that inevitably plagued a conquering colonial power, thus underlining
the “limitations of colonial power and knowledge.”71 In the 1920s and 1930s,
British officialdom may not have felt panic, but neither was the Indian admin-
istration fully sure of what it had in Gandhi and the INC, nor sure how to access
such information either.72 One particular intelligence brief on Bengal strikingly
articulated what this lack of reliable and consistent intelligence cost the Raj as
the nationalist movement expanded: 
Information is everywhere hard to come by. Police officers are insulted when
they go into villages in search of it, and are refused shelter because everyone
who helps a police officer is boycotted. Government is, therefore, without
information of what is going on in the interior, and it would, in the circum-
stances at present existing in parts of Bengal, be possible for whole tracts of
country so to come under Congress domination that the authority of
Government would be completely ousted without the Government being
much the wiser.73
In such an environment, officials may indeed have filled the void with pre-
sumptions or, in other words, “a series of flimsy pretexts that were always
becoming texts.”74 If poorly informed, however, colonial authorities were not
always completely uninformed. What about the role of culture when officials
possessed at least some concrete information? Did cultural beliefs ultimately
remain the determining influence in the colonial mind, so powerful that not
even masses of contradictory evidence could overwhelm them? 
71 Bayly, Empire and Information, 171; see also Martin Thomas, “Colonial States as Intelligence
States: Security Policing and the Limits of Colonial Rule in France’s Muslim Territories,
1920–1940,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 6 (December 2005): 1033–60, esp. 1038. 
72 Bayly, Empire and Information, 171. 
73 IOR, L/PJ/12/390/63-68, Weekly Intelligence Bureau Report, 21 May 1931. 
74 Thomas Richards, The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire (London:
Verso, 1993), 4. 
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Congress and Provincial Elections 
From 1932 through 1935, and even up to the provincial elections held as part
of the reforms in early 1937, British officials in India and at the India Office
stressed that some very limited concessions might go a long way in India.
Again, these arguments relied on colonial conceptions of Indian, especially
Hindu, character and behavior; but they also dwelled on the importance of com-
munal and caste divisions for Britain’s long-term strategy in India. Malcolm
Hailey, the dean of the Indian Civil Service, Governor of the United Provinces,
and a key adviser to the India Office in this matter, saw the nationalists as inher-
ently weak, or at least weak-kneed, and opined that many Indian politicians had
realized that they had bitten off more than they could chew. He sensed among
Indians that “[t]he nearer we get to [giving India] any practical measure of
responsibility, the greater seems to be the hesitation to assume it.”75 In New
Delhi, Viceroy, Lord Willingdon, argued that all “the Indian” really wanted was
“to be able to say before the world that he is administering his own country,”
while in truth leaving the heavy lifting to British.76 Hailey reckoned that these
Indians would accept something much less than self-rule rather than take over
the rigorous tasks performed by the British administration, a sentiment con-
veyed to the Indian Secretary, Samuel Hoare, by the Governor of Madras as
well.77 There also remained the belief that even the prospect of provincial
autonomy alone in India would be enough to pull many away from the national
congress movement through the prospects of offices, jobs, and patronage.78 An
India Office administrator summed up this approach to the nationalists this
way: “The Bengali is an emotional creature with a bad inferiority complex ….
Anything which goes to persuade him that great opportunities are open to him
is all to the good.”79Willingdon was convinced that the lure of patronage would
draw Indians into the provincial assemblies, telling a former Indian governor
that “in the end [the INC] will come in — the loaves and fishes are too tempt-
ing!”80 In the last days before the passage of the 1935 act, John Anderson, the
Governor of Bengal, reported that there was “very little conviction” behind
75 India Office, Hailey Papers (hereafter HP), Mss. Eur. E.220/25a/50-53, Hailey to Geoffrey de
Montmorency, 12 November 1932; see also HP, Mss. Eur. E.240/52a/7, Hailey to Findlater
Stewart, 26 September 1932. 
76 India Office, Willingdon Papers (hereafter WP), Mss. Eur. F.116/54/46-47, Willingdon to Sir
Harcourt Butler, 26 May 1933. 
77 India Office, Erskine Papers (hereafter EP), Mss. Eur. D.596/12/11-12, Lord Erskine to Hoare,
22 December 1934. 
78 Bodleian Library (hereafter BL), Sir John Simon Papers (hereafter JSP), 71/146-154, Hailey
to Hoare, 28 February 1932, copy. 
79 India Office, Anderson Papers (hereafter AP), Mss. Eur. F.207/5/2-5, Findlater Stewart to Sir
John Anderson, 9 March 1932. 
80 India Office, Harcourt Butler Papers (hereafter HBP), Mss. Eur. F.116/54/116-117, Willingdon
to Harcourt Butler, 25 November 1935. 
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continued Indian criticism of the proposed reforms.81 Thus informed, the
Secretary of State for India found confirmation, even at the end of 1932, of his
“impression that Indian public opinion … is prepared to accept a scheme pro-
vided that we keep the initiative and do not delay too long about it.”82
Hailey also introduced the notion that sectarian considerations, not ideas
about self-rule, would dominate Indian discussion of the reforms. In India, a
place where religion was supposedly paramount, “it will be the Communal
Award which will be the touchstone, not questions of federation, or franchise
and the like.”83 As Hailey noted to a former ICS colleague, “the cow is still the
most important figure in Indian politics!”84 From Calcutta, the British governor
reported, “what really rankles in Bengal is the Communal Award [and] the
Poona Pact,” and that local politicians had told him they would work the reform
scheme “for it is realized that non-cooperation will only serve to consolidate the
position of the Muslims [and] Depressed Classes.”85 The idea of a hierarchical
and caste-dominated India further bolstered the arguments of those who
thought it would be possible to deflect Indian political aspirations with a few
well-chosen and calculated concessions. They viewed the nationalist movement
as inevitably hindered by social division and stratification, with a large gulf
between a small cadre of élite leaders and the ordinary Indian peasants who had
been coaxed into following them. In early 1934, with Nehru imprisoned, a frus-
trated Willingdon noted that Gandhi continued to draw crowds, but only
“because these stupid people still look upon him as a holy man.”86 Hailey
summed up the situation thus: “in the East democracy is being demanded not
by the great mass of the people themselves, but by an intellectual class which
hopes thereby to gain control of the people.”87 Hailey and others predicted
therefore that the more conservative Indian masses had only a weak loyalty to
the Congress babus and their revolutionary ideas, and that the British might
profitably deepen this split by providing some moderate political reforms.88 For
Madras, both Willingdon and the governor, Lord Erskine, saw the reforms as
reinvigorating the provincial Justice Party, which would attract the votes of
newly-enfranchised non-Brahmins who opposed the Brahminical INC.89
81 AP, Mss. Eur. .F.207/5/355-357, Anderson to Hoare, 25 March 1935. 
82 BL, SJP, 75/57-58, Hoare to Simon, 30 December 1932. 
83 HP, Mss. Eur. E.220/27c/35-354, Hailey to J. Crerar, 14 June 1934. 
84 HP, Mss. Eur. E.220/27c/463-467, Hailey to F.H. Brown, 19 July 1934. 
85 AP, Mss. Eur. f.207/5/348-349, Anderson to Hoare, 10 December 1934. 
86 WP, Mss. Eur. F.116/54/71-72, Willingdon to Harcourt Butler, 21 February 1934. 
87 HP, Mss. Eur. E.220/21b/399-403, Hailey to J.T. Gwynn, 13 August 1931; HP, Mss. Eur.
E.220/24e/587-590, Hailey to Sir Dinshaw Washa, September 1932. 
88 BL, Davidson Papers [Mss. Eng. Hist.], c.556/55-56, J.C.C. Davidson memorandum on Indian
tour, 28 March 1933; BL, JSP, 77/64-71, Willingdon to Simon, 15 October 1933. 
89 WP, Mss. Eur. D.596/8/8, Erskine to Willingdon, 23 April 1935. 
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According to these arguments, then, the proposed reforms would insure British
control in India by, first, weakening nationalist resolve through the promise of
office-holding and, second, by providing a political system which would
encourage an Indian tendency towards localism and social division. 
Between the summer of 1935 and the elections of 1937, sentiment in New
Delhi and in the provinces continued to run towards the idea of eventual INC
participation in the federal scheme, with the corollary that such involvement
would ultimately cause major divisions in the nationalists’ ranks. In particular,
a series of intercepted letters and communications fuelled official speculation
that a real breach had opened between Gandhi and Nehru over the future pro-
gram of the party.90 Gandhi agreed with Nehru’s initial distaste for the new
federal constitution, but the Mahatma could “not accept practically any of his
methods” nor Nehru’s conviction of a coming “class war.”91 Even if the
Congress did stand in the provincial elections scheduled for early 1937, the
party’s leaders had not yet decided whether they would take office and form
ministries should they win. In 1936, the INC decided on the first of these issues:
it would put up candidates in the provinces. Nehru, touring the country in sup-
port of this effort, found enormous crowds greeting him; “India is wide awake
and expectant,” he wrote.92 In UP, Madras, and Bombay, among other places,
the INC launched extraordinary, and quite public, political mobilizations, tar-
geting rural areas in particular.93 The scale and scope of the Congress effort
could be seen especially in Bombay, home both to urban workers and rural agri-
culturists. In the summer and early fall of 1936, for example, Gandhi and
Congress politicians organized campaigns of political outreach in rural districts
like East Khandesh, while Gandhi also inserted himself as a potential mediator
into a major millworkers’ strike in Ahmedabad, drawing a crowd of 10,000
there on one occasion.94
When provincial governors undertook to explain the Indian political situa-
tion in 1936 to the new Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, they continued nevertheless
to underestimate Congress’s prospects and its cohesion.95 Nearly every gover-
nor forecast that the INC might get some seats in the new assemblies, but not
enough to gain control of them. Governors who had emerged from the ICS
ranks, as well as those who were political appointees from London, all specu-
90 WP, Mss. Eur. E.240/8/753-754, Willingdon to Hoare, 5 May 1935. For an example of such
intercepted correspondence, see MSAO III/VII, Bombay Police Commissioner’s File
3001/H/34, a copy of Gandhi’s letter to Nehru, 22 September 1935. 
91 MSAO III/VII , copy of Gandhi letter to Agatha Harrison, 30 April 1936. 
92 Quoted in Low, Britain and Indian Nationalism, 262. 
93 See Kudaisya, chap. 5. 
94 MSAO III/VII/53-55, Bombay Secret Abstract, August–October 1936. 
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Civil Service and others who surrounded him,” see J. Nehru, The Discovery of India (Calcutta:
Signet Press, 1946), 528. 
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lated with some confidence about political prospects in their provinces. The
failures of these predictions were remarkable not only individually, but collec-
tively as an indictment of colonial capabilities, and thus are worthy of some
detailed attention. Indeed, this episode provides a real sense of the dynamic of
colonial information-gathering and dissemination, and of the flaws inherent in
it. It also demonstrates that, at times, even these seemingly confident officials
felt the need to issue significant caveats about the analyses they provided. 
Perhaps the most active of these provincial officials was, unsurprisingly,
Erskine in Madras. Even before Linlithgow’s arrival, Erskine had thrown him-
self into an analysis of local politics. He had in the Justice Party, after all, a
group he found worth watching and encouraging, and through 1935 he had
Viceroy Willingdon, the former governor of the province, who remained keenly
interested in its affairs. Erskine’s assessment of the situation in Madras grew
more ambivalent through 1935 and 1936, likely in response to the very fluid
state of provincial politics. In April 1935, he made such a case to Willingdon: 
In regard to Madras, if we were to have an election this year the result would
undoubtedly be a Congress majority …. It is by no means certain that there
will be Congress majority in Madras when the first elections under the new
Constitution come to be held. There has been a rather remarkable result in the
Municipal Election at Bezwada, held 10 days ago. The Justice Party have done
very well there and retain control of the Council …. But the present electorate
for the Municipal Council is to all intents and purposes the same as that pro-
posed in the Government of India Bill for the new Provincial Assemblies. So
it is probable that the new voters, most of them will be non-Brahmins, will
give the Justice Ministry another lease of life.96
Two months later, however, the governor was much more pessimistic,
though his thinking would not admit any recognition of Congress’ growing
strength: 
The Justice Party is undoubtedly going down hill rapidly and the Congress are
advancing, not on account of their own merits but simply owing to the unpop-
ularity of their opponents. This in my view is entirely due to the supine
indolence of the Ministry. The Justice Party have no organisation to speak of
and the Ministers never go about the Presidency explaining and defending their
own policy with the result that the Congress is having it all its own way.97
The prospect of an INC ministry taking office in Madras did not dismay
either the governor or the viceroy, however. Both believed that Congress was
96 India Office, Erskine Papers (hereafter EP) Mss. Eur. D.596/8/8, Erskine to Willingdon, 23
April 1935. 
97 EP, Mss. Eur. D.596/13-15, Erskine to Willingdon, 6 June 1935. 
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eager to get back into local politics, “panting to take office” and “secure some
of the spoils of office.” This meant that a Congress ministry would not act
obstructively, but would do nothing “but play the game.”98 Willingdon repeated
such a view throughout 1935, in fact, judging that Congress would not be able
to resist the provincial legislatures and the “desire for a share in the loot.” “[I]n
the end,” he argued, “they will come in — the loaves and fishes are too tempt-
ing!”99 A Congress victory would not mean a triumph for radicalism either,
according to Erskine, for “No Brahmin with any self-respect can join the
Justice Party, owing to its communal tenets, and thus the Congress in Madras
is full of Brahmins who are really moderate politicians.”100 Just before the
provincial voting, Erskine’s mood swung again. He now expected the Justice
Party to “maintain a firm hold on the Telugu districts.”101 And save for “a com-
plete landslide,” Congress would not “obtain an absolute majority over all the
other parties and groups.”102 A month later, Erskine reported, “[t]hat landslide
has now taken place.” Unembarrassed by their earlier failed forecast, however,
Madras authorities soon predicted that Congress would take office, and not
obstruct the legislature, so as to ensure “the spate of jobs for Brahmins that their
followers had been led to expect.”103
Hyde Gowan, Governor of the Central Provinces, saw the INC gaining
only 34 out of 104 seats, largely due to the fragmentation of local politics.104
Even when a local Indian notable warned the governor that the Congress would
take over 60 seats, both Hyde Gowan and one of his district commissioners dis-
agreed, predicting only half that number.105 Indeed, in early 1937, local
officials continued to tell the governor that the Congress was only assured of
34, though he told Linlithgow that it “passes the wit of man to guess the final
result.”106 In the end, the INC picked up 70 seats, with Gowan sputtering that
the nationalists had made “absurd promises — a free house per man, halving
98 EP, Mss. Eur. D.596/8/24, Erskine to Willingdon, 14 August 1935; EP, Mss. Eur. D.596/8/27-
28, Willingdon to Erskine, 23 August 1935. 
99 HBP, Mss. Eur. F.116/54/106-109, Willingdon to H. Butler, 7 August 1935; HBP, Mss. Eur.
F.116/54/116-117, Willingdon to H. Butler, 25 November 1935. 
100 EP, Mss. Eur. D.596/8/42-46, Erskine to Linlithgow, 17 April 1936. 
101 Erskine to Linlithgow, 6 January 1937, quoted in Towards Freedom 1937-47: Volume I:
Experiment with Provincial Autonomy 1 January – 31 December 1937, Chopra, P.N., ed. (New
Delhi: Indian Council of Historical Research, 1985), 21–3. 
102 Erskine to Linlithgow, 3 February 1937, quoted in Towards Freedom, 84–6. 
103 EP, Mss. Eur. D.596/8/191-197, Erskine to Linlithgow, 18 May 1937. 
104 IOR, Linlithgow Papers (hereafter LP), Mss. Eur. F.125/12, Sir Hyde Gowan to Lord
Linlithgow, 10 November 1936. Hyde Gowan was quite ill as well, another limitation on his
ability to gather information in his province. In fact, he left office early in 1938, and died in
March, just after his voyage home. 
105 LP, Mss. Eur. F.125/12, Hyde Gowan to Linlithgow, 17 December 1936. 
106 Hyde Gowan to Linlithgow, 13 January 1937, quoted in Towards Freedom, 33–5. 
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the land revenue, and so on. A sad comment on democracy.”107 Like Erskine,
Gowan saw a bright side too. He told Linlithgow that the provincial intelligence
officer had concluded that the average Congressman elected was “of very poor
ability,” and that many of the “more able” men elected from the Congress were
not true party devotees “at heart.”108 The Governor of Bihar, who had argued
that INC organization was more apparent than real, due to its reliance on “per-
sons otherwise unemployable,” characterized a Congress victory there as “as
much of a surprise to Congress as to their opponents.”109
A vivid example of these officials’ struggles with political intelligence was
the case of John Hubback, presiding in Orissa. In October 1936, he had esti-
mated that a “weaker” Congress in the region might take anywhere from 12 to
22. Two months later he was more specific, seeing 18 for the party. By January,
he was hedging his guesses though, noting that if the INC took all the “doubt-
ful seats,” it would end up with 25; but also remarking that his “District
Officers … take a view somewhat over favourable to the chances of Congress
candidates.” When all the votes were in, Congress had 36 seats, leaving the
hapless Hubback to argue that the party was “no less surprised than others.”110
Hubback’s problems were not, however, entirely of his own making; the infor-
mation he received from the field was hardly unimpeachable, though not for the
reasons he had adduced in January. For example, a district officer in Koraput in
Orissa had estimated that the INC might take one of the district’s three seats;
they took all three.111
A slightly more accurate rendering of the political scene in 1936 came from
the UP, where Harry Haig had succeeded another senior ICS man, Malcolm
Hailey, as governor at the end of 1934. Haig admitted that Congress popularity
in the province was “definitely beyond expectation” and while he still expected
non-Congress groups to get “a working majority over the Congress,” he did not
believe the margin would be very great.112 The chief intelligence analyst for the
province was more forthright in admitting his inability to predict the outcome of
the elections, though he did see potential in non-Congress parties: 
Party politics in the U.P. are in a continuously fluid state at present ….
Congress have organizational assets of great value, but the local influence of
the landlords and the zamindars is still immense, and if only this influence can
107 LP, Mss. Eur. F.125/12, Gowan to Linlithgow, 10 February 1937. 
108 LP, Mss. Eur. F.125/12, Gowan to Linlithgow, 26 February 1937. 
109 LP, Mss. Eur. F.125/12, James Sifton (Governor of Bihar) to Linlithgow, 3 November 1936. 
110 LP, Mss. Eur. F.125/12, John Hubback (Governor of Orissa) to Linlithgow, 24 October and 17
December 1936; 12 January and 1 February 1937. 
111 LP, Mss. Eur. F.125/12, Hubback to Linlithgow, 1 February 1937. 
112 India Office, Haig Papers (hereafter HHP), Mss. Eur. F.115/16/8-26, Haig to Linlithgow, 29
October 1936. 
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be fully developed to produce a strong united anti-Congress front, Congress
will be hard put to it to make good its claims to popular support.113
The report concluded, moreover, with the type of sentiment seen elsewhere
in the colonial administration. The overall picture in UP was of an “undignified
scramble for seats in the new Councils, in which opportunism and personal
considerations come first and all others a poor second.”114
Nevertheless, Haig realized the limitations of his capabilities, or at least
acknowledged them indirectly. In his initial assessment for the viceroy in early
1937, Haig admitted that he was “a little out of touch at the moment,” but that
recently he had had “interesting talks with Sapru and Chintamani [another
moderate].”115 Within a month of this analysis, in fact, Haig conceded that his
officials might not be the best judges of the political atmosphere. Having met
and listened to a non-Congress landholder and office-seeker, the governor
warned Linlithgow: “I am inclined to think that candidates are at the moment
in closer touch with what is going on in the villages and certainly in the minds
of the villagers than our district officers are, and I feel that things may have
gone rather further than we officially realize.”116
One of the few officials to match Haig in obliquely noting his own limita-
tions was Michael Keane in Assam, who reported in January 1937: 
I have scarcely seen any of the three Indian Members of my Government for
the last month or more. They are all away in their constituencies and have too
much on their minds to bother about files. Administration is in fact being con-
ducted in the old bureaucratic style and no one seems any the worse for it.117
The overall result was INC victories in many provinces and, ultimately, the
ministries in seven of 11 provinces under coordinated party control. It was,
Zetland wrote, “a much greater measure of success for the Congress than any of
us anticipated.”118 Nevertheless, both in London and in India, officials put on a
brave face and argued that, all appearances to the contrary, the election did not
signify a true popular ratification of the Congress. This sort of rationalization
had appeared even before all the votes were cast. Herbert Emerson, a long-serv-
ing ICS man and governor of the Punjab, saw “a great stirring of the political
consciousness of the masses,” but also doubted whether any effects of this mobi-
113 HHP, Central Intelligence Office (UP) (hereafter CIO), Mss. Eur. F.115/16/47-55, Report of D.
Pilditch, 30 October 1936. 
114 HHP, CIO (UP), Mss. Eur. F.115/16/47-55, Report of D. Pilditch, 30 October 1936. 
115 Haig to Linlithgow, 6 January 1937, quoted in Towards Freedom, 18–21. 
116 Haig to Linlithgow, 26 January 1937, quoted in ibid., 76–8. 
117 Keane to Linlithgow, 19 January 1937, quoted in ibid., 45–6. 
118 Zetland to Linlithgow, 1 March 1937, quoted in ibid., 183–5. 
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lization would “be more than temporary.”119 James Sifton, governor of Bihar,
offered the “broad view” that the results were “evidence of the weakness of their
opponents rather than of the strength of the Congress party.”120 The viceroy,
however, offered the boldest re-reading of the evidence: “It is easy, however, to
exaggerate the permanent effect of such a campaign and, notwithstanding the
success of the Congress in the elections of certain Provinces, I am inclined to
think that they are still far from having such an organization and such a unity of
purpose as would make them as formidable as they would like to be.”121
Post-election analyses returned to the assumptions that had led administra-
tors to think that Indian Hindus, in particular, were incapable of such a feat. The
fault lay with the “greatly enlarged and very ignorant electorate,” one gripped
by “extreme sentimentality and timidity,” and one that had fallen for all of the
Congress’ “absurd promises.”122 Sifton believed that 90 percent of the voters
there saw the ballot box simply as a “letter box for Gandhi.”123 Apart from
these condemnations of the Indian electorate, a few other themes emerged in
officials’ post-mortems. There was some grudging acknowledgment of the
Congress’ organization, but this was often couched in the complaint that other
parties had not prepared themselves at all for the elections.124 Brabourne
lamented a lack of “party discipline” in a non-Brahmin rival to the INC, while
Haig criticized UP-landed élites who had fallen victim both to arrogance and to
“petty personal feuds.”125 Zetland was more positive when he told the cabinet
that “among parties and groups other than the Congress the real work of party
formation is still to come.”126 The Indian secretary may have found encour-
agement for such a sanguine judgment in the viceroy’s own rather optimistic
sense that the election results did not show deep anti-British feeling: “It is
[Linlithgow wrote] only to the extent that the notion of taxes is linked to
‘Government’ that there has been any direct anti-Government (and therefore, to
some extent, anti-British) prejudice raised in the villages.”127
119 Emerson to Linlithgow, 21 January 1937, quoted in ibid., 57–8. 
120 Sifton to Linlithgow, 9 February 1937, quoted in ibid., 111–13. 
121 Linlithgow to Zetland, 5 March 1937, quoted in ibid., 200–1. 
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An even more common sentiment was that the Congress victory was more
problematic for the party than a defeat might have been, especially as the
Congress leadership had not yet decided on accepting office. Some in the party
seemed in fact quite eager to do so: they would “not indefinitely allow them-
selves to be deprived of the power and the privileges to which they have been
looking forward.”128 In the viceroy’s estimation, this left Nehru and Gandhi
“both concerned to prevent provincial autonomy breaking up the all-India unity
and discipline of Congress.”129 Linlithgow still believed “in the potency of
Provincial Autonomy to destroy the effectiveness of Congress as an All-India
instrument of revolution.”130 The “provincial outlook” of many Indian politi-
cians would in the end fracture the present “artificial unity in the Congress
ranks.”131 Furthermore, colonial officials contended that such electoral success
had shocked many in the INC, at both the national and provincial levels, leav-
ing the “more intelligent amongst them … to regret the wildness and
multiplicity of the promises to which they are committed!”132 Hyde Gowan had
“a feeling that Congress is slightly awed by the situation” and “the serious
responsibilities of Government.”133 Zetland’s officials at the India Office con-
curred, arguing that Congress had wanted only enough votes to become an
“effective nuisance without caring for any responsibility.”134 Now the INC had
to deliver, but in an environment in which its support, according to Haig, was
“very wide but not yet deep.”135 A few months after the election, only a few
British officials seemed to have noted the larger lesson learned: “There are fis-
siparous tendencies in the Congress, which superficial observers are inclined to
think must soon break the movement, but past history shows that any such idea
is an illusion.”136 The viceroy, once characterized by Nehru as “heavy of body
[and] slow of mind,” remained sure that office-holding would bring a more
moderate Congress, interpreting the actions of the nationalists as a sign that
they had “so entirely and unconditionally accepted our point of view.”137
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All of these explanations for Congress victories, as well as many of the
optimistic assessments of the pitfalls such success presented the nationalists,
found their way from India to London, and via Zetland, to the cabinet itself. The
illegitimacy of the vote, the false promises made by Congress to electors, and
the potential split in the party over taking office, all of these informed the mem-
oranda Zetland prepared for his colleagues. As an explanation of Congress
success, he offered a picture of rural India provided by Linlithgow: “The vil-
lager, trained by circumstance to respect power, voted for the party who
appeared at the moment to possess power.”138 As an assessment of the future,
the secretary argued, “The dilemma is one for the Congress rather than for the
Government and there is no occasion for us to help them out of their difficul-
ties.”139 And as a vision of Indian opinion, Zetland presented to the cabinet the
image of “the vast host of silent Indians sitting on the fence waiting to see
which way the cat was going to jump.”140 Among the cabinet, Hoare was one
of the few to offer any advice or reaction to Zetland’s report, urging the secre-
tary and the viceroy “to maintain contact with the Congress in the Provinces
and to seize any opportunity that offered of persuading them to take office at
any time.”141 Hoare still seemed to believe in the efficacy of his scheme. 
The 1937 elections illuminated many aspects of the British approach to
political intelligence in India. The analyses offered by governors, viceroys, sec-
retaries, and denizens of the India Office showed the great confidence — at
times a confidence undiminished by previous misreadings — many of these
officials displayed in discussing Indian politics and in making sweeping and
speculative pronouncements. Especially well-assured were those conclusions
and statements that drew heavily on assumptions of Indian behaviour, old impe-
rial nostrums that possessed a real resilience in the official mind. These
assessments drew on other sources too, of course, but here again they demon-
strated some of the limits of colonial information-gathering. The India Office
and the cabinet relied on officials who were actually in India, but who utilized
fairly limited resources. The viceroy and his governors had some access to
Indian opinion, but only of an élite sort and, apparently, only intermittently.
Even when these superior officials did receive what turned out to be sound
advice, either from Indians or from lower-ranking officers and collectors, they
were as likely to discount or even disregard it as to pass it on. Complicating the
process of intelligence collection even further, of course, was the fact that
138 “Memorandum by the Government of India on Indian Provincial Elections,” 19 May 1937,
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139 India Office Memorandum for Cabinet, 12 March 1937, quoted in Towards Freedom, 221–7;
see also “Confidential Appreciation of the Post-Election Political Situation in India,” 19 March
1937, quoted in ibid., 242–4. 
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events in India, especially when subject to a superficial or partial reading, pro-
vided just enough support for what were often ill-judged or ill-informed analyses. 
There certainly existed tension within the INC leadership over the question
of office acceptance, and over the distinction between taking office to govern
and taking it so as to “wreck” and obstruct and further colonial reform
schemes.142 Nehru was himself well aware that his embrace of the latter strat-
egy, as well as his strong socialist sympathies, put him at odds with many of his
colleagues.143 Eventually, as Sapru observed, Nehru “yielded to the strength of
public opinion among his followers” and accepted the creation of Congress
ministries in the provinces, though Nehru also remained on guard for what he
termed “counter-revolutionary” tendencies among these politicians.144 Those in
the INC who wished to accept office, and to govern thereafter, had a variety of
reasons for doing so. Failure to take office might allow other, smaller parties to
“consolidate their power and make [the INC’s] work more difficult.”145 In par-
ticular, Congress politicians in Madras held this view quite strongly. There, as
Hermann Kulke and Dieter Rothermund have noted, the party had not yet con-
solidated the substantial gains it had made over the past five years against the
Justice Party, and office acceptance likely seemed an attractive way to solidify
the Congress position.146 To the notion that politicians were eager to enter leg-
islatures solely for their own benefit, those in Madras responded that the
Congress membership had already agreed to cap ministers’ salaries, meaning
that it was “not the desire for emoluments of office but honest conviction that
thereby we can advance the struggle for Swaraj” that drove such a policy.147
Despite the potential for splits in the Congress in 1937, therefore, these fissures
did not actually occur. Through Nehru’s flexibility and willingness to compro-
mise, Gandhi’s efforts at intra-party diplomacy and, perhaps most important,
the enthusiasm of provincial Congress parties for governing as a committed,
idealistic party, Congress was able to take office and work coherently at both
the local and national levels.148 A national “High Command” coordinated the
142 See J.P. Srivastava to Sapru, 8 March 1937, quoted in Towards Freedom, 209–10. 
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work of provincial governments, and in turn these local politicians continued to
build grass roots support for the party.149 The 1935 act had not, as its propo-
nents hoped, divided the party; in fact, it had done the opposite. After 1937, the
INC could claim ever-increasing national support, as it built on its electoral vic-
tories and used political power to attract and bind the population to it. Thanks
to the India Act, the Congress could also claim something more valuable than
organization, though. In an election held on a larger franchise than ever before
— 30 million men and women (15 percent of the population) were eligible to
vote and nearly half did — they had done well in both urban and rural areas.
The party now had significant popular validation, complicating one of the Raj’s
most consistent defenses against the nationalists: the argument that the INC did
not represent India. The expansion of the electorate had not, in the end, weak-
ened Congress, but had given the party an opportunity to display its actual
strength and to suggest what it might do in a fully democratic India. 
* * *
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